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III. A FAMILY DIVIDED-LABOR MAKET DUALITY IN KOREA i
A. Introduction
1. Korea's rapid i"ecovery from the 1997-98 financial crisis was facilitated by labor
market reforms. Such reforms included emergency legislation to allow dismissal of workers for
"urgent managerial reasons," legalization of temporary work, increased government expenditure
on labor market programs, the expansion of the Employment Insurance System, and the
introduction of a "productive welfare" system through the National Basic Livelihood Security
Law (NBLS). These steps facilitated corporate and financial restructuring. They also supported
the quick retu to low unemployment rates, at 3Yi percent recently.
2. While total unemployment rate has
been low in Korea, the labor market is
increasingly characterized by a high degree of
"duality." There is a core of regular workers,
who are harder to dismiss than their counterparts
in most other OECD countres, parly because
employers are required to "exhaust all means"
before laying offworkers. Moreover, procedures
for dismissals can be particularly cumbersome.
Because of the high cost of regular workers,
employers increasingly have tued to nonregular
workers to fill positions, raising their share to
one-third of total employees, one of the highest in the DECD. Nonregular workers, especially in
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), face job insecurity and weak enforcement of minimum
labor standards, lower wages, and low levels of social protection.
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3. The government has recognized the problems associated with the divided labor
market, releasing in late 2003 a "Reform Proposal for Industrial Relations." This proposal
aims to create a new framework for industrial relations that would allow the government to step
back from individual labor disputes, narow the divide between regular and other workers. and
make labor relations less confrontationaL. In order to increase labor market flexibility, the
employment protection framework would be reformed by shortening the notification period for
dismissals and easing conditions of dismissal for companies undertaking banptcy
proceedings. It also includes measures to improve the social safety net, including by expanding
the social insurance systems. and to increase protection for nonregular workers.
4. This paper analyzes the causes and macroeconomic consequences of Korea's dual
labor market and discusses the government's reform proposals. The paper is organized as
follows: Section B describes the main featues of the labor market and the social safety net.
i This paper was prepared by Dong He and Thierry Tressel (APD).
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Section C analyzes the causes and consequences of labor market duality. Section D discusses the
major elements of the government's reform proposals and Section E reviews relevant
experiences of labor market reforms in other OECD countries. Section F concludes.
Market structure
B. Labor Market Structure and Institutions
5. The 1997-98 financial crisis had
signifcant impact on the labor market.
Unemployment rose sharply, from
2.6 percent in November 1997 to a peak of
8.6 percent in February 1999, while labor
force participation fell by 1.5 percentage
points benveen 1997 and 1999. Unskiled
workers and young workers were the most
affected. Wages responded flexibly, falling
by 5.9 percent in nominal terms and
12.5 percent in real terms between July 1997
and July i 998, cushioning the impact on
employment. Unemployment soon retued
to pre-crisis levels, while wages parly
recovered their pre-crisis levels in 1999.
Nevertheless, labor force paricipation rates
remain low, at 65.4 percent, about
5 percentage points below the DECD
average, partly because female paricipation
is stil low, at 53.4 percent. Younger
workers experience strctully higher rates
of unemployment, associated with both
longer job search and less stable jobs.
6. The crisis also reinforced the shift
away from regular employment. The share
of regular employment had stared to decline
before the crisis; however, temporary and
daily employment rose sharly as the
economy was recovering, accounting for
about 90 percent of the increase in wage
contracts between 1998 and 2002. Thus,
overall labor market flexibility has been
achieved through an increasing degree of
duality of the labor market. The core of
regular workers with a high level of
employment protection is supplemented by
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Unemployment Rate by Education
2001 2002 2003
Jan-Sept
Total
High School Graduates or Lower
Junior College Graduates
3.8
3.7
5.4
3.1
3.0
4.7
3.4
3.3
5.0
Youth (15-29 years old)
High School Graduates or Lower
Junior College Graduates
7.5
8.0
7.2
6.7
7.0
5.9
7.6
8.0
7.1
Source; Jeong (2003)
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a large group of temporar and daily
workers, whose numbers can be easily
adjusted in line with changing economic
conditions. According to the Ministr of
Labor, the proportion of nonregular
employees stood at 32.6 percent as of
August 2003. Measurement problems
notwithstanding, this figue is among the
highest in the OECD area (Box II. i). The
increase in the share of nonregular workers
contrbuted to a decline in the average job
tenure. After reaching a peak of 6. i years in
1998, workers' average tenure in Korea has
declined to 5.6 years in 2002. This contrasts with average job tenure of 1 1.3 years in Japan,
9.8 years in the ED, and 7.4 years in the U.S. in the 1990s.
7. The shift away from regular
employment does not simply reflect the
expansion of small or medium size
enterprises. Employment at SMEs did grow
very fast in the wake of the 1997-98 crisis,
raising its share in total employment from
74.4 percent in i 997 to 85.6 percent in
2001.i However, a significant share of
anual changes in nonregular employment
could not be accounted for by employment
changes at SMEs.3 For instance, in 1998, at
least half of the jobs destroyed at SMEs
were regular jobs.4 Conversely, employment
growth at SMEs was strong in 2000, although the number of nonregular jobs barely changed.
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2 SMEs in Korea are generally defined as companies employing fewer than 300 employees.
More specific definitions are stipulated for agrcultue and services, with an employment
threshold varyig between 200 and 30 employees.
3 From an international perspective, a large and active SME sector is not inconsistent with a
dominance of regular jobs: Japan and Germany, for instance, have about 70 percent of wage
earners employed in SMEs, even though only 12 percent of employees have nonregular
contracts. Another case in point is Ireland, where 72 percent of employees work in SMEs, and
less than 10 percent of employees are nonregular workers.
4 This is the lower bound estimate, obtained by assuming that all nonregular jobs destroyed in
1998 were at SMEs.
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Box 111.1. Labor Market Duality in Korea: How Big a Concern?
Labor market duality can be assessed by quantifying the incidence of precarious jobs. In principle, precarious
jobs are found among employees and among non-employees (i.e., self-employed and unpaid family workers).
However, non-employees account for a negligible share of employment in most OEeD countries. Therefore, the
OEeD focused on temporar jobs among employees to count and analyze precarious jobs. The OEeD defined
temporar jobs (or nonregular jobs) as "those forms of dependent employment which, by their natue, do not offer
workers the prospect of a long lasting employment relationship" (OECD, 2002). This definition includes fixed-term
contracts, temporary agency workers, daily workers, contracts for a specific task, replacement contracts, etc.
Data published by the Korean National Statistical
Offce (NSO) suggest that Korea has the highest
share of nonregular employees among OECD
countries. According to the NSO, the share of regular
employees in total employment stood at 32.6 percent in
the third quarer of 2003, less than the share of non-
employees (35.6 percent) and about the same as the
share of nonregular employees (31.8 percent). Hence,
the share of regular employees in total employment is
much lower than in all OECD countres: regular jobs
accounted for more than 60 percent of total
employment in most OECD countres in 1998 (Marin
and Torres, 2000). Only Spain had a similarly high
level of nonregular jobs (about 25 percent oftotal
employment). Self-employment is also very high in
Korea, and unpaid family workers were about 8 percent
of total employment in the third quarer of2003, while
they account for less than 3 percent of employment in
most OECD countries.
Composition of Employment
(2003 Q3; in percent)
Total 100
Employees
Regular
Nonregular
Of which: Temporary workers
Daily workers
Non-Employees
Self-Employed
Unpaid Family Workers
64.4
32.6
31.8
22.4
9.4
35.6
27.7
7.9
Source: National Statistical Offce
The distinction between regular and nonregular workers is reflected in a number of dimensions. Nonreguar
workers are paid lower wages, are entitled to fewer benefits, and are not well covered by the social safety net.
Nonregular workers earn 20 percent less than regular workers, after controlling for various factors (OECD, 2003). In
addition, they are excluded from certai benefits such as severance pay (which is also a "retirement allowance") and
childcare and maternity leave. Finally, they are not well covered by the social safety net either because they are not
eligible (as a result of the short duration of contracts), or because employers do not comply with mandated social
contributions. Thus, less than 8 percent of nonregular workers are covered by unemployment insurance, medical
insurance, or the national pension (Cho, 2003).
The actual number of nonregular employees-according to the OECD definition-is likely to be significantly
lower, however, than reported by the NSO. The NSO defuies nonregular workers as those who have contracts of
less than a year, and those who are not entitled to several frnge benefits. Hence, a large number of employees are
classified as nonregular because they have no written work contract or are not entitled to cerain allowances, even
though they remain with their employer on a longer-term basis. Excluding such workers, the Ministr of Labor
estimates that 32.6 percent of employees (equivalent to 21 percent of total employment) had nonregular jobs in
August 2003, instead of the 49.4 percent as estimated by the NSO. Meanwhile, the OECD has calculated tht only
about 17-18 percent of employees are temporar workers, by reclassifying certn categories (such as contractors)
into self-employment. Even in this case, the proportion of temporary employees in Korea remains high by OECD
stadards; it is well below the proportion of temporar employees in Spain (31.5 percent), but about the same as in
Mexico and Portugal. Moreover, adding non-employees with precarious jobs (such as unpaid family workers) to
temporar employees would reinforce the perception of a dual labor market.
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8. Wages for regular workers have
been growing much faster than those for
nonregular workers. While wages for
regular workers have been growing at close
to double digits in recent years, nonregular
workers have seen their wages stagnate.
Wage differentials by size of enterprises are
also substantial: after controlling for workers'
observable characteristics such as gender,
education, tenure, age, and jobs'
characteristics, such as industr and
unionization, firms with over 500 employees
were found to have paid wages about 20 percent higher than firms with less than 30 employees
(Jeong, 2003). Another factor contrbuting to the wage differentials between regular and
nonregular workers is the seniority-based wage system in Korean firms. As regular workers
tyically stay employed with the same employer for a long period of time, their wages grow
automatically with seniority.
Wage Differentials
(In percent)
2000 2001 2002
Large firms to small firm
Regular to nonrgular
workers
122.5 124.3 119.5
125.3
Source: Jeong (2003).
9. Income inequality has widened since the crisis. Between 1995 and 1999, the Gini
coeffcient increased from 0.28 to 0.32, and remained stable since then. The ratio of the income
of the richest 10 percent of households to the poorest 10 percent rose from about 3.8 in 1997 to
more than 4.2 in 2002 (Choi, 2003). While such changes in income distrbution might reflect
c()mplex economic and social forces at work, such as the strctural rise in the demand for skilled
labor and direct consequences of the 1997-98 financial crisis, one additional explanation is that
the growth ofnonregular jobs in smaller firms widened wage inequality toward the bottom of the
distrbution (Choi and Kim, forthcoming).
Employment protection
10. Korean regular workers enjoy some of the strongest employment protectiou in the
OECD. The strct preconditions for terminating an employment relationship (at least in firms
with five or more employees) led the DECD to ran Korea 2nd out of 27 countres in a
comparson of the strictness of employment protection for regular workers (OECD, i 999a).
According to the Labor Standards Act (LSA), an employer canot dismiss, suspend, or take other
discipline action against an employee without "just cause." The LSA does not specifically state
what reasons wil constitute just cause; however, precedent has set a high standard for what
constitutes 'Just cause." An employer who has committed an unjust termination may be subject
to criminal sanctions and/or civil remedies, including imprisonment for up to five years or a
criminal fine of up to W 30 milion.
11. The LSA introduced in 1998 the concept of redundancy dismissal and employment
adjustment for "managerial reasons", which were further defined by a reference to
"transfers, mergers and acquisitions." The LSA revision also defined preconditions for
collective dismissal, in other words, those involving large number of employees. Layoffs,
including for "urgent managerial reasons," have to follow stringent criteria and procedures.
These include: (i) the employer must make every effort to avoid dismissals, in other words,
dismissals should be used only as the last
resort in adjusting the workforce; (ii) the
selection of employees to be dismissed must
be based on fair and reasonable criteria;
(iii) the employer must consult sincerely (in
good faith) with trade unions as to the
measures to avoid dismissals and selection
of dismissed workers; and (iv) employee
representatives or unions must be notified at
least 60 days in advance of layoffs.
Industrial relations
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12. The characteristics of industrial relations system and the role of unions in Korea
have been affected by legal provisions as well as by economic conditions. Labor rights were
restrcted under the authoritarian political regimes in the past. Since the late 1980s, the emphasis
of reforms has shifted from ensuring smooth industralization and economic development to
strengthening labor rights by guaranteeing the autonomy of the bargaining system and bringing
labor legislation in line with internationally-accepted standards. Nevertheless, the lack of mutual
trst between labor and management remains deep-rooted, often leading to hostile confrontations
and destrctive strkes.
13. Despite the low penetration rate of
11 percent, labor unions in Korea have
been influential because of the high
unionization rate among large firms.
Economic troubles experienced by large
downstream firms can be spiled over
quickly to small upstream firms though the
web of subcontracting, Prolonged work
stoppages in large downstream firms place
small upstream firms at risk because work
stoppages often result in delayed payments
to the upstream firms which do not have
easy access to external finance.s
Key Indicators of Industrial Disputes
200 i 2002 2003
Number of strikes 235 322 320
Workers involved (persons) 88,500 93.809 137,241
Lost working days (OOOs) 1,083 1,580 1.299
Production oss (in bilions of won) 2.126.9 1,717.7
Source: Ministr of Labor.
5 75 percent of SMEs in the manufactung sector supplied more than 95 percent of their output
to downstream firms (Km, 2002).
Social safety net
14. The social safety net has developed
relatively recently. While in the past the
extended family has provided a source of
income support for those fallng in povert,
its role has declined as family ties have
weakened as a result of modernization.
Budgetary allocation for welfare spending
has increased following the crisis, rising at
18 percent on average since 2000. However,
government spending remains low as
compared to other OEeD countries,
reflecting the late development of social
insurance and pension systems.
15. The coverage of the Employment
Insurance System (EIS) remains low,
despite major steps taken. After the crisis,
the coverage of the EIS was expanded to all
firms, and the length of the employment
period required for eligibility was sliortened.
Moreover, the benefit duration and the
minimum amount of benefit have been
increased. As a result, unemployment
benefits are now comparable to other DEeD
countres. However, the coverage of the EIS
remains limited. While 67 percent of wage
and salary workers are now eligible, only
50 percent are insured.6 Moreover, only
about 19 percent of the unemployed receive
benefits, mainly because uninsured workers
are more likely to become unemployed. The
main reason for the limited coverage of the
EIS is the non-compliance of employers
with social contributions, especially in small
businesses. A recent study of the EIS
estimates that the average compliance rate
stood at 53 percent in 2000, with
noncompliance being concentrted among
SMEs (Cho, 2003).
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The Coverage of Employment Insurance
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40%
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10%
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Sorc M.nilryf)flAOO.
6 Daily workers, with less than one month of employment, and par-time workers who work less
than 18 hour weekly, could not paricipate in the EIS before Januar 2004.
- 40-
16. The traditional social assistance program has been modernized with the
introduction of the National Basic Livelihood Security Act. The NBLS, in effect since 2000,
provides cash benefits for those earning less than the offcial poverty line. Benefits have been
raised, and are now close to the minimum cost ofliving (DECD, 2000). However, only about
half of the poor receive benefits because the eligibility criteria are unusually strict. For example,
eligibility depends on the capacity to ear (not the actual income) of the extended family (not of
the household).
17. Various active labor market programs were introduced during the crisis to
supplement the EIS. Some of them, including job subsidies and public works, have been
gradually phased out as the economy recovered. The impact and perfoff1ance of these programs
were considered poor, because of lack of targeting, and perverse incentives created by the
relatively high cash benefits provided by the public work program (OECD, 2000). Training
programs for the unemployed were also expanded. While their performance was weak initially,
they appear to have improved over the past years, as the employment rate of training graduates
rose from 21.8 percent in 1998, to 41.9 percent in 2002.7 Various steps have been taken to
improve programs, including better targeting, financial incentives of training institutes based on
performance, and closer links to the local labor markets.
C. The Causes and Consequences of Labor Market Duality
What causes the increase in nonregular employment?
18. In OECD countries, there appears to be a close association between the strictness of
employment protection for regular workers and the share of nonregular employment.
Countres that have strcter employment protection legislation for regular workers also tend to
have higher nonregular employment (Booth et ai., 2002). In contrast, Ireland, the U.K, and the
U.S., countres that have low levels of employment protection, have very low rates of temporary
employment despite having no regulations against the use of such contracts. Cross-country
analysis suggests that temporary contracts are typically used as substitute for regular contracts, as
there does not appear to be any relationship between employment growth and the change in the
share of temporary employment (Garibaldi and Mauro, 2002).
19. In Korea, several factors explain the increasing duality ofthe labor market after the
crisis. More reliance on nonregular jobs reflects firms' attempts to cut labor costs and increase
their capacity to adjust their labor force in line with economic conditions, as regular workers are
more expensive to hire and fire, in both monetary and administrative terms. Strctural shift in
labor demand, including declining demand for less skiled workers, and the need to reallocate
7 A robust analysis of the performance of those programs controllng for trainees' characteristics
is not available. Thus, the conclusion is only tentative.
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production after the crisis, may have also made employers reluctant to offer regular contracts to
such workers. 
8
20. The changes to dismissal standards introduced in 1998 have not made it easier for
viable firms to adjust regular employment. In fact, most job losses in 1998 were due to
bankruptcies, especially among SMEs. Moreover, redundancy for "managerial needs" accounted
for only a tiny proportion of job losses (6.3 percent in 1998, and 1.2 percent in 2001), and only
32 collective dismissal cases, involving 2,390 employees, were reported to the authorities in
2000.9 Indeed, it has been argued that the new regulations have made it more difficult to layoff
workers (Kim, 2002). Before the crisis, redundancy layoffs were not banned as the Supreme
Court had acknowledged managerial needs for layoffs in previous rulings. Arguably, by
introducing strct procedural requirements, the new legal provisions, intended to suppress
excessive and unecessary layoffs, imposed severe constraints on finns' abilty to layoff
workers. For instance, the necessary "sincere" consultation with unions could tum
confrontational, and prevent adjustments in the labor force whenever there were divergent views
regarding economic conditions.lo Similarly, the requirement to "exhaust all means" to avoid lay-
offs could, in practice, make lay-offs almost impossible.
Does labor market duality reinforce confrontational industrial relations?
21. Labor market duality reinforces the bargaining power of unions because workforce
adjustments are likely to be borne first by nonregular, non-unionized workers. Moreover,
given the lack of a secondar market for regular jobs, and the high risk of being downgraded into
nonregular and unstable jobs, workers oppose flexibilty even if they would not remain
unemployed for long periods. In addition, the underdeveloped social safety net leaves Koreans
little means of making ends meet once they are out ofajob, increasing workers' resistance to
increased flexibility.
22. Confrontational industrial relations in Korea also reflect the "insider-outsider"
problem. First, there is the tension between workers in large unionized firms and workers in
small, unorganized firms. High wage growth as a result of union bargaining in large firms limits
growth of jobs in those firms. Workers unable to find jobs in large firms because of the high
wage growth look for jobs in smaller firms, effectively increasing labor supply to smaller firms_
This widens the wage gap between workers in small and large firms. Moreover, the monopsony
power of large downstream firms implies that wages at upstream SMEs cannot compete with
8 The rising demand for skiled workers relative to unskilled workers is ilustrated by the
observation that the college premium rose from 47 percent in 1995 to 52 percent in 2001 (Jeong,
2003).
9 As reported by the Ministry of Labor.
to A case in point is Hyudai Motor Co. which was able to layoff only 277 employees in i 998
(instead of the 8,000 originally planed), despite a 40 percent capacity utilization rate in March
1998 (Choi and Kim, forthcoming).
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those at large finns. Second, there is the tension behveen the employed and the unemployed. As
union members lose membership when becoming unemployed, the jobless population's interests
are not internalized by unions when negotiating over wages and employment conditions.
23. Legal restrictions on union activity may also have contributed to union miltancy.
The DECD has pointed out that, as a result ofthe broad definition of "unlawful acts" and the
wide definition of "essential services" where strke action is severely restricted, police action
against strkers in Korea has in the past been triggered by a lower level of disruptive action than
in many other countries, hindering efforts to foster a stable industrial relations climate (OECD,
2000).
Is labor market duality bad for equity and effciency?
24. Labor market duality raises concerns for the welfare of non regular workers. Wage
differentials between nonregular and regular jobs do not reflect observable components of
productivity: the average wage penalty associated with a temporary contract is significant, and
oscilates between i 0 percent and 27 percent in most OECD countries, after accounting for
workers' and jobs' characteristics (OECD, 2002). In addition, the short duration of temporary
jobs-usually less than a year-often disqualifies nonregular workers from benefits. In Korea,
less than 8 percent of nonregular workers are covered by the unemployment insurance, the
national pension or the medical insurance (Cho, 2003). This is a source of concern because
nonregular workers are likely to disproportionately bear the unemployment costs of labor
demand shocks.
25. Labor market duality has negative consequences for efficiency. Empirical evidence
shows that nonregular workers receive less formal training by their employers than regular
workers, after accounting for workers' and jobs' charactenstics (OECD, 2002). This is a concem
for human capital accumulation if mobility into regular employment is limited. Moreover, a large
share of nonregular employment is likely to reinforce the bargaining power of insiders who feel
more insulated from labor demand shocks. As insiders are able to obtain higher wages, firms'
incentives to invest in new technologies diminish. 
11
26. An adequate level of mobilty of the core segment of the labor force is important to
the growth of total factor productivity. High firing costs may reduce the economy' average
productivity by maintaining a fraction of the workforce working with technologies that are not
up-to-date (Saint Paul, 1999). Even if on-the-job training could promote leaming-by-doing, it is
questionable that it will be sufficient to adapt to major technological shocks. Recent growth
theory indeed considers that the essence of the growth process is a continuous inflow of new
firms making old firms obsolete, with the associated waves of job destrction and job creation
(Aghion and Howitt, 1998). The entry of new firms increases productivity indirectly as well, by
forcing incumbent firms to be more efficient, in paricular in innovative industries (Aghion et ai.,
ii For instance, Bentolina and Dolado (1994) show that, in Spain, an increase of one percentage
point in the temporary employment shae raised the growth rate of permanent workers' wages by
about 0.3 percent.
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2003). In particular, a conducive business environment and adequate job opportunities in
younger firms will permit new entrants to challenge the market power of large incumbents by
allowing the former to attract talented workers. In such a world, an adequate level oflabor
mobility is crucial to promote economic growth.
D. The Government's Reform Proposals
27. The new government of President Roh has recognized the critical importance of
improving industrial relations and enhancing the efficiency of the labor market in Korea.
The government believes that the lack of flexibìlty of the core segment of the labor market
presents a major impediment to achieving the strategic goal of making Korea a business hub for
northeast Asia. Accordingly, the Ministry of Labor set up in May 2003 a "Research Committee
on Industral Relations System Development", comprised of 15 academic specialists, with a view
to developing proposals. Based on the report of the research committee, the Ministry of Labor
issued its own "Reform Proposal for Sound Industral Relations," laying out an action plan to
take policy measures to improve industral relations, increase labor market flexibility, and
strengthen social protection for vulnerable workers.
28. The Tripartte Commission is discussing the proposals of the research committee
with a view to developing consensus among the social partners. The government plans to
submit legislation to the National Assembly on issues that have been thoroughly discussed by the
Triparite Commission. It wil gradually promote the issues that are raised for the first time in the
proposal after discussions by the Tripartite Commission. The government has also pledged to
enforce laws dealing with ilegal strikes, as well as combating unfair labor practices by
employers, and strengthening the social safety net.
29. The first objective of the reform proposals is to minimize social costs associated with
industrial conflcts. The government aims to prevent excessive industrial action by helping
labor and management maintain a balance of power. To this end, both workers' basic rights and
employers' counter-rights wil be strengtened by revising relevant labor law provisions, taking
into account recommendations by the ILO and the OECD. The rights of association will be
strengthened by, among others, allowing the unemployed to join non-enterprise level trade
unions, and legalizing payment of wages to full-time union workers. While easing institutional
restrictions on industrial action (for example, by abolishing the concept of "essential public
services" where strike action is prohibited or severely restrcted), employers wil be allowed to
have lockouts regardless of the legitimacy of industral actions. Employers wil also be allowed
to use replacement workers through new recruitment and subcontracts in cases of legal strkes in
public services.
30. The second objective ofthe reform proposals is to increase labor market flexibilty
while ensuring job stabilty. Dismissal stadards wil be relaxed by shortening the notification
period and easing conditions of dismissal for companies undertaking banptcy proceedings.
The advance notice period for dismissal will vary depending on the scale of dismissal, with a
60-day upper limit. Criminal punishment for unfair dismissal wil only be imposed on repeated
unfair dismissals. Labor laws wil also be amended so that there wil be greater clarity in the
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terms of labor contracts in cases of o\:vership change such as mergers and acquisitions. It is
proposed that employment rules and collective agreements should be honored by the new
employers for certain specified periods of time (for example, one year).
31. The third objective of the reform proposals is to strengthen social protection for
vulnerable workers. The govemment aims to reduce income gaps between workers of large
companies and SMEs, and between regular and nonregular workers, and to strengthen
mechanisms for redressing discrimination against nonregular workers. To increase job security
for fixed-term workers, those working for the same employer for over two years through
multiple contract renewals wíl be entitled to the same rights as regular workers and thus enjoy
the same standards of dismissals. The govemment also plans to expand the coverage of the
employment insurance and industral accident compensation systems over nonregular workers. A
major obstacle to expanding the coverage of social insurance programs has been the failure of
reporting and making contrbutions by employers at small enterprises. To tackle this problem,
the government is planing to upgrade legal enforcement, including by allowing workers to
register themselves with the Employment Insurance System. Labor market programs for long-
term unemployed and aged workers wil also be strengthened.
32. The reform proposals of the Ministry of Labor offer more flexibilty to management
in exchange for greater support of union activities. If the reforms are implemented, they wil
be an important step contributing to more harmonious industrial relations and more effcient
labor market outcomes in Korea. However, additional reforms would be needed to increase
flexibility significantly. The procedure and requirements in case of lay offs for managerial
reasons would remain strngent, and the requirement of using dismissals as last resort wil
continue to keep employment adjustment costs high.
E. Lessons from International Experience
33. To fight rising structural unemployment, many OECD countries implemented labor
market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Countres that have been the most successful in
reducing structual unemployment are those that have been the most determined in implementing
a comprehensive range oflabor market reforms.12 Countres have eased the stringency of
employment protection, either by easing employment protection for permanent workers (Spain
and Finland), or by deregulating the use of temporary contracts. 
13
12 The DECD (1999) found that the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, as well as Canada and Australia, had been the best in terms of improving labor market
pedormance.
13 Italy, Greece, Korea, Spain and Sweden have allowed the use of 
temporary work agencies.
Restrictions on fixed-term contracts were eased in Germany, Italy, Austra, Belgium, Finland,
France, the Netherlands, Portgal, and Sweden among others (OECD, 2002).
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34. There appears to be some degree of substitutabilty between employment protection
and unemployment benefits in OECD countries. The countries that adopt stronger dismissal
restrictions tend to have smaller unemployment insurance programs, and vice versa. This
tradeoff reflects political economy considerations: there is more demand for employment
protection if unemployment benefits are low. Such observations notwithstanding, stronger
competitive pressures, such as those arsing in the context of globalization, are shiftng the
balance of the two institutions in favor of mobility-frendly unemployment benefits. Job-security
oriented labor market institutions, which are focused on protection of primary breadwinners'
labor income, are proving to be íl-suited to accommodate new demands for mobility, and more
broadly, microeconoinic adjustment (Boeri and others, 2003). In the context of globalization and
fast technological progress, a strategy for Korea would be to strengthen the social safety net
while easing employment protection for regular workers.
35. In order to reduce labor market duality and narrow the divide between regular and
nonregular workers, some countries are searching for a middle ground. Some countries
have sought to reduce the job precariousness of nonregular workers by restricting the use of
nonregular contracts, but this does not seem to have worked. The Spanish experience in the
1990s is a case in point (Box m.2). Temporary employment in Spain had been rising since the
mid-eighties, with no effect on the high rate of unemployment. A first reform in 1994 aimed at
restricting the use of temporary contracts was not successful, because such administrative
restriction did not address the incentive problems facing the employers.
36. A more effective approach has been to create incentives for employers to hire
regular workers by lowering the costs of such hires, for example, by offering a Dew type of
regular contract with lower labor adjustment costs. Such a contract is more attractive to
employers than the existing permanent contract while at the same time it offers better job
security than enjoyed by the current nonregular workers. Again, the Spanish experience is
pertinent. A second reform in i 997 led to the introduction of a new permanent contract with
lower severance payments for unfair dismissals. This reform appears to have been successful in
stimulating growth of regular jobs in the private sector. Between 1997 and 2000, 1.5 milion jobs
were created in Spain, almost thee-quarters of which were hired under the new permanent
contracts. As a result, the proportion of temporary employment in the private sector fell
markedly.
F. Concluding Remarks
37. The structure ofthe Korean labor market is evolving. Many high-paying and stable
jobs were lost durng the financial crisis, and they have been largely replaced by low-paying and
unstable jobs when the economy recovered. The increasing scarcity of regular jobs reflects their
high cost. Strct employment protection for regular workers and union power in large firms
reinfôrce each other, reducing employers' incentives to hire regular workers. In the face of fierce
product market competition, employers are likely to continue the trend to hire more nonregular
workers in order to contain labor costs. On the other hand, new entrants to the labor market such
as college graduates tend to view such temporary jobs as trps and prefer to wait for
opportities to get regular jobs. This imbalance in supply and demand is being reflected in
higher unemployment rate and longer job search among the youth.
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Box III.2. The 1997 Spanish Labor Market Reform
The Spanish labor market is characterized by strict employment protection for permanent
workers, and it has become segmented over the past two decades. Strct employment protection
for permanent workers combined with a deregulation of temporar employment in 1984 fueled a
sharp rise in the share of temporary employment from about 15 percent in 1987 to more than
35 percent in 1995. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate remained high. In 1994, the government
passed a law to restrct the use of temporary contracts, and broaden the definition of dismissals for
economic reasons. However, temporar employment continued to rise and effective firing costs did
not fall significantly, as courts interpreted the law in favor of workers (Mauro, 1998).
In 1997, the employers' associations and the main labor unions reached an agreement on a
reform package to reduce effective dismissal costs and promote employment stabilty. The
intersectoral agreement led to the promulgation of two Decree-Laws which were ratified as Acts by
Parliament in June 1997. The main element of the reform was the creation ofa new permanent
contract, available to groups of workers who had diffculties finding permanent jobs (Mauro, 1998).
The new permanent contract differed from the existing one on severance payments. Specifically, the
compensation in case of unfair dismissals was reduced to 33 days per year of service (with a ceiling
of 24 months pay) from 45 days per year of servce (with a ceiling of 42 months pay) for the existing
permanent contracts. The existing permanent contracts were not affected by the reform. The new
permanent contract was available to certain categories of workers, including certain categories of
unemployed workers-long-term unemployed people, unemployed people between the ages of 18
and 29, or above 45-and workers under a temporary contract. To encourage employers to hire under
this new permanent contract, social contributions were reduced by 40-0 percent for the first tvvo
years of the contract. The agreement was initially valid for four years, after which the performance of
the measures had to be evaluated in order to decide whether to abolish or adopt them as permanent.
The 1997 reform was followed by a rise in permanent employment, and contributed in
reducing uuemployment. Between 1997 and 2000, 1.5 milion jobs were created in Spain,
76 percent under permanent contracts (Dolado et al., 2002), as unemployment fell to 13.6 percent in
2000 from 21.4 percent in 1997. Moreover, in 1998, two-thirds of permanent contracts signed were
of the new tye, and more than 2.5 milion new-tye permanent contracts were signed between 1997
and 2000 (OBCD, 2000 and 2001).
The reform was seen as a success, and the new permanent contract was prolonged in 2001.
According to the OECD, the "remarkable" labor market performance in the late 1990s was partly due
to the labor market refonns of the 1990s to reduce employment rigidities, even though additional
reforms remained necessar to increase flexibilty. The proportion of temporary workers fell only
slightly, however, to 31 percent in September 2002 from 33 percent in 1997, because the rise of
permanent employment in the private sector was offset by higher temporary employment in the
public sector (OECD, 2001, and Dolado et al., 2002). The introduction of the new permanent
contract contributed significantly in ending the rising trend of the share of temporary employment, as
this did not simply reflect the cyclical increase in the demand for labor (Dolado et al., 2002). In
2001, when the new permanent contract was prolonged, the coverage was extended, as only male
workers between 30 and 45 years remained on the old contract.
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38. For more effcient labor market outcomes, it would be desirable to both lower the
hiring and firing costs of regular workers and expand the coverage of the social safety net.
To be sure, increasing labor market flexibility requires not only refonns of labor laws and
institutions For example, it would also require reforming the seniority-based wage system so that
wage flexibility can be improved. Stil, fuer reduction in the costs of labor adjustment,
particularly administrative and judicial steps that are seen by firms as the major cost of
employment protection legislation, are the key steps necessary for significantly enhancing the
flexibility of the labor market, to make it better adapted to Korea's rapid economic development.
In the meantime, strengthening the social safety net wil help regular workers adjust to a more
mobile labor market and promote social cohesion.
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